trade, and production across countries. We find that 20-30% of the decline in U.S. and EU final demand was borne by foreign countries, with NAFTA
Introduction
The Global Recession of 2008-2009 was sudden, severe, and synchronized. In the months preceding September 2008, the housing and financial sectors in the United States and several European countries experienced increasingly negative outcomes.
During this period, there was very little spillover to other sectors and countries.
However, beginning in September, the crisis in these few sectors and countries spread suddenly to encompass virtually all sectors and all countries. In the fourth quarter of 2008, real world GDP contracted by 6.5 percent (annualized), and it fell a further 7.9 percent in the ensuing quarter, among the most severe declines since the end of World War 2. Nor was the decline in output limited to the largest economies. GDP fell in countries directly exposed to the U.S. and Europe, as well as in countries with minimal direct exposure. fall in real world GDP by a factor of roughly four. 2 The synchronized decline in output across countries and the collapse of world trade are obviously closely related.
Trade transmits country or sector-specific shocks abroad. For example, the "demand spillovers" in standard open-economy macroeconomic models that cause output to comove across countries are channeled through trade. More fundamentally, changes in output and demand automatically imply changes in imports and exports in any standard trade model. Taking the collapse of output or demand as given, a collapse of trade naturally follows.
Traditionally, these theoretical links between trade and output have been thought of in terms of final goods. A large and increasing share of trade, however, involves goods at different stages of the sequential production process. Consequently, attention has shifted to studying explicitly the roles of production sharing and of trade in intermediate goods. 3 This shift in perspective is important because trade in intermediate goods has many implications for understanding the transmission of shocks across borders and the empirical relationship between demand, trade, and production.
In this paper, we focus on three key implications. 4 First, the presence of traded intermediate goods implies that measures of aggregate openness and bilateral exposure to foreign demand changes must be modified. For example, exposure to changes in foreign demand depends on the share of GDP that is absorbed into final demand 2 Source: IMF-GDS. 3 See Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) , Miroudot and Ragoussis (2009) , or Amador and Cabral (2009) for evidence on rising vertical specialization. 4 We do not address many other implications of intermediate goods trade. For example, we do not address how de-fragmentation of international production chains in response to shocks or increased trading frictions could lower trade. Thus, the mechanism highlighted by Yi (2003) is not covered in this paper. In addition, we do not study how low elasticities of substitution across stages in a production chain might amplify shock transmission, a point that has been emphasized by Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008). abroad, not on the share of exports in GDP. Moreover, bilateral exports do not determine exposure to specific foreign destinations, because changes in demand for exports from a particular source (e.g., China) may be passed upstream through the production chain to input suppliers (e.g., Korea). Second, when sectors differ in the extent of their integration into cross-border production chains, the sectoral composition of demand changes will matter for the overall response of trade and the transmission of those changes. Third, cross-border vertical linkages tend to cause exports and imports to move together for a particular country, because imported inputs are used to produce exports.
To capture these influences, we need to measure intermediates trade and trace out international production chains. To that end, we combine national input-output tables with bilateral trade data to construct a synthetic global bilateral input-output table, (hereafter, global input-output table) as in Johnson and Noguera (2009). 5 There are two components of this framework. First, the global input-output matrix is an (NS×NS) table, with S sectors and N countries, that records the approximate value of goods produced in sector s country i that are used as intermediates to produce goods in sector t, country j. Second, the final demand vector for each destination is an (NS × 1) vector indicating the value of final goods purchased from sector s in source i. Together, these two objects indicate how output from each source country is allocated between intermediate and final use for each destination country to which that output is shipped. Further, for an individual sector in a given destination, the framework provides both the sector and country origin of intermediates purchased.
This global input-output framework links demand to production via trade flows. 6 Therefore, we can use it to trace demand changes through the production structure.
Specifically, we manipulate the global input-output framework to develop expressions for a country's production, exports, and imports as weighted averages of sector and country-specific demand changes. The weight on individual elements of the vector of demand changes depends on both intermediate and final goods linkages across sectors and countries. Because each variable -production, exports, or importshas a unique set of weights, each responds differently to a given vector of demand changes. These weights can be thought of as partial elasticities; they translate proportional changes in demand in a particular sector and destination into proportional changes in production and trade (holding demand in all other countries and sectors constant). One contribution of the paper is to compute these elasticities using our detailed global input-output framework.
With these partial elasticities in hand, we conduct two quantitative exercises that shed light on several key issues in the transmission of the crisis and in the trade collapse. First, we study how changes in final demand in the U.S. and Europe generated changes in trade and production at home and abroad.
7 Second, we measure the elasticity of world trade to world production implied by our framework given the realized changes in demand in all countries. In both exercises, we focus on the important role that sectoral composition of demand changes plays in explaining the strength of the trade transmission mechanism and the magnitude of the trade response to changes in final demand. 6 Because we use national accounts definitions in classifying intermediates and final goods in constructing this table, the data can be matched to standard macroeconomic data. 7 We compute the response of trade and production to realized US and European demand changes, not identified idiosyncratic shocks. Realized changes combine the effect of exogenous shocks and the endogenous propagation of those shocks, which we do not model explicitly.
We find that changes in final demand in the U.S. and the EU15 during the crisis were strongly transmitted abroad via international trade. For the U.S., we estimate that 27% of the fall in U.S. demand and 18% of the fall in total EU15 demand was borne by foreign countries in terms of lower GDP. (Note that in our exercises, we hold constant foreign final demand.) The strength of the spillovers reflects the important role played by durable goods. The change in demand for durables was roughly 4-6 times larger than for non-durables and services. In addition, durable goods are intensively traded, as both final goods and intermediate goods, compared to non-durables and services.
At the regional and bilateral levels, spillovers were naturally strongest for countries with strong trade linkages with the U.S. and the EU15. Further, because the U.S. and EU15 together constitute 60% of world GDP in our data, countries with the strongest linkages suffered large output declines. NAFTA (Mexico and Canada) GDP falls by 70% as much as U.S. GDP following the decline in U.S. demand, while GDP in Emerging Europe falls by 35% of the fall in EU15 GDP following the decline in EU15 demand. Spillovers were also strong for countries specialized in production of durables, such as Japan, China, and Emerging Asia.
As the transmission channel for these spillovers, international trade suffered large declines as well. These declines reflect both final and intermediate goods linkages.
For example, both exports and imports for NAFTA countries fell substantially following the change in U.S. demand (even though non-U.S. demand is held constant).
Imports declined owing to the use of imported intermediates in production of exports. Imported intermediates also declined substantially in China and Emerging Asia following the fall in U.S. and E.U. demand.
Turning to the overall decline of world trade, we find that the elasticity of world trade to world GDP is 2.8 in our framework. We obtain this elasticity by feeding estimated demand changes for durables, nondurables, and services for all countries through the input-output framework simultaneously. This elasticity lies between two natural benchmarks. One benchmark value is one, which would arise if all demand changes were the same size across sectors and countries. The fact that the elasticity is substantially above one indicates that the changes in (final) demand were not symmetric across sectors and countries. The second benchmark is the observed elasticity (about 4) in the crisis episode. We are able to "explain" 70% (2.8/4) of the trade collapse via changes in (final) demand alone, despite the fact that our framework embeds strong proportionality assumptions at the country and sector level.
Importantly, we document that the estimated elasticity of trade to GDP is high because we allow asymmetries in demand changes across sectors. Combined with our previous results, we conclude that models that fail to appropriately disaggregate demand changes will not generate quantitatively realistic trade elasticities.
The next section of the paper reviews the related empirical research. Section III lays out our framework and discusses the data. The following section develops expressions for elasticities of output and trade to sectoral changes in demand. Section V then applies our framework to the Global Recession. The final section concludes.
Related Empirical Research
Our work contributes to an active contemporary literature on trade and propagation of the Global Recession, which itself builds on a number of recent developments at the intersection of international trade and international macroeconomics. and Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar (2008) argue that bilateral trade in intermediates helps explain the positive association between bilateral trade and the correlation of output at the sector level. We highlight the importance of intermediate goods linkages for tracking shocks through the production structure to the sectors and countries that ultimately produce the final goods that are absorbed in a particular destination. In this sense, we argue that the multilateral structure of production sharing and cross-sector intermediate goods linkages matters above and beyond bilateral sector-to-sector linkages.
Second, we contribute to a growing consensus that changes in demand were a central determinant of the collapse in trade. Specifically, we provide evidence that the large decline in trade could be rationalized by a large fall in the demand for durables. This theme surfaces in Alessandria, Kaboski, and Midrigan (2010) ; Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2010; Engel and Wang (2009) ; Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010); Wang (2010) , and many contributions to the VoxEU ebook on the trade collapse edited by Richard Baldwin.
8 While we emphasize the role of demand changes in driving trade, we do not necessarily downplay the role of increased trade frictions, such as heightened policy barriers, inventory adjustment, and/or trade credit disruptions, in explaining the trade collapse. 9 These frictions may well be quite important in accounting for residual declines in trade and bilateral re-orientations of trade that our framework does not capture.
Among these many recent contributions, our work is most closely related to Eaton, Kortum, Neiman, and Romalis (2010) , so we pause to discuss the differences 8 Borchert and Mattoo (2009) with benefits and costs discussed below. The primary analytical difference is that Eaton et al. (2010) perform an accounting exercise in which they decompose the fall in trade into four shocks or wedges: demand, productivity, trade deficits, and trade costs. We focus exclusively on the effects of changes in demand; we feed these changes into our framework, and compute, for example, the overall elasticity of world trade to world GDP. We also examine the role of intermediate goods and
final goods in determining this elasticity.
Lastly, our work also contributes to the recent literature attempting to explain the distribution of the impact of the crisis across countries. Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010) , Imbs (2010) , and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) 
We can then rewrite this market clearing condition in terms of percentage changes across two points in time:
where b x ≡ (
) denotes the percentage change in variable x. There are two hurdles in using this framework for our analysis.
First, we need measures of quantity shares
for all i, j, s, t. If we observe shipment values computed at a common set of prices, then we can equate quantity shares to value shares. That is, if p i (s) is a common price used to compute the value of all shipments, then
. We therefore insert value shares computed in this manner from our benchmark data in place of the quantity shares to get:
Second, we do not directly observe either b q
. Therefore, we proceed to make additional assumptions to tie these to observables. First, we assume that the production function is Leontief so that the change in the quantity of inputs shipped from sector s in country i to sector t in country j is proportional to the change in output in sector t:
. Second, we assume that preferences are also Leontief so that the change in the quantity of final goods shipped from sector s in country i to country j is proportional to the change in real demand for output from sector s in country j:
Because we take the reduction in final demand from data, we do not need to take a stand on other aspects of preferences.
These assumptions imply that both final and intermediate input demand changes are sector, not source specific.
11
In fixing these quantity shares, we tie our own hands with attendant costs and benefits. The main benefit is that we can use available aggregate data to study the propagation of the crisis and trade collapse. A secondary benefit is that by shutting down the response of quantity shares to relative prices, we implicitly narrow the scope of our analysis to ask whether we can explain the collapse of trade solely based on the composition of demand changes across sectors and countries. The main cost is obviously loss of realism, as bilateral input sourcing and final goods shipments surely responded to relative price adjustments and changes in border frictions during the crisis. These adjustments are one reason why output and trade changes in our framework will not match the data exactly.
The failure to capture these responses may not be a large loss, however. Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar (2010) report that bilateral export and import shares did not change substantially for the United States during the crisis. Moreover, Behrens, Corcos and Mion (2010) argue that the share of intermediates sourced from abroad changed little in Belgian firm level data.
With these assumptions, we can then re-write equation 2 as:
Stacking and manipulating these expressions for many countries, we show in Ap-
where S ij are matrices with elements S ij (s, t) recording the share of output from sector s in country i used directly or indirectly to produce final goods of sector t that are absorbed in country j. These share matrices depend on the structure of both final and intermediate goods linkages within and across countries. We discuss this interpretation at length in Appendix A.
We calculate real changes in aggregate output, exports, and imports using Laspeyres quantity indices. 12 Aggregate real output growth is given by:
12 Because we have input-output data only for the base period, we are constrained to initial where y i = P s y i (s). Aggregate real export and import growth are then given by:
where ex i and im i are the value of total exports and imports in the base period.
Example: Three Countries, One Good Per Country
We proceed directly to an example to fix ideas. Suppose that there are three countries, and that each country produces a single aggregate good. Then we can write real output in each country as a function of aggregate demand changes as 
where s ij is the share of gross output from country i that is used directly or indirectly in producing final goods absorbed in country j.
Looking at source country i, output can be written as:
These shares attached to demand changes can be interpreted as elasticities describing period prices and share data. Once we have a solution for output changes as a function of demand changes, 13 Further, note that if there is a one percent disturbance to country 1's demand alone (q we can compute how demand changes feed through to changes in real trade:
where we have defined We can further refine these expressions to express changes in trade as a function of demand changes alone by noting that we have previously solved for real output changes as a function of demand. For notational clarity, we focus here on country 1 and substitute for output changes to express changes in trade as a reduced form function of the demand changes:
These expressions yield an explicit scheme for linking demand disturbances to trade outcomes, where we again think of these weights as elasticities of trade to demand changes. These elasticities depend on the input-output structure in a complex, though intuitive, way. For example, imports in country 1 depend on demand changes in country 2 because imports contain intermediate goods that are processed into final goods that are ultimately consumed in country 2. Further, exports in country 1 depend not only on demand changes abroad, but also on domestic demand changes because an increase in domestic demand increases consumption of foreign produced goods that contain exported domestic intermediates. These responses are manifestations of cross-border vertical linkages in the model.
These vertical linkages imply that exports and imports for a given country tend to move together in response to idiosyncratic changes in demand. That is, following a fall in demand in country 1, both imports and exports fall. In contrast, in the absence of these vertical linkages, only imports would decline following the idiosyncratic domestic downturn. Whether imports are more or less responsive than exports to domestic demand is an empirical matter. In our data, imports typically put a larger weight on the domestic disturbance than exports. Therefore a disturbance to country 1 alone (q 
Proportionality of Trade and Production
In analyzing the recent trade downturn, the proposition has been advanced that, as a matter of theory, trade should respond proportionally to overall economic activity (production or demand), regardless of whether or not there are vertical production linkages.
14 On the other hand, the data indicate that the elasticity of trade to GDP for the world as a whole is on the order of 3.5 in recent data, and rising over time. 15 We believe these two observations can be straightforwardly reconciled by acknowledging that the composition of demand changes has an important influence on the elasticity of trade to aggregate production. To understand the role that shock composition plays, we pause here to formalize some intuition about the manner in which trade and production jointly respond to demand changes.
To illustrate the basic issues, we turn to the three-country, one-sector example presented earlier. In this case, the conditions under which trade and global production are proportional are easy to describe with reference to equation 7 linking output growth to demand changes and the trade equations 11 and 12. Note that if changes in demand are equal in proportional terms across countries (b q
then changes in output are also equal across countries (with b
they are weighted averages of the demand changes, with weights that sum to one. It follows that world real output growth also naturally equals the world change in final demand. Finally, proportional changes in exports and imports for every country are also equal to b q d , since for each country they are a weighted average of the demand changes. Thus, with identically-sized demand changes across countries trade falls proportionally with income. This special case with complete symmetry in demand changes across countries is the only situation in which exact proportionality holds.
With many countries and sectors, the conditions needed to generate a unit elasticity of trade to total production are considerably more restrictive. Namely, changes in demand must be symmetric across both sectors and countries. Asymmetric demand changes in this framework will cause the elasticity of trade to income to deviate from one. In this event, general results are not attainable. Whether trade responds more or less than proportionally to production depends on both the initial economic configuration (e.g., production levels, allocation of demand, intermediate goods intensity, etc.) and how the pattern of changes in demands interact with this configuration. Though the precise elasticity depends on the particulars of the scenario, we quantify below the actual empirical elasticity of trade to output changes implied by our input-output framework given the configuration of changes in demand during the 2008-2009 recession.
Data
To operationalize the framework laid out in previous sections, we need to measure In the data, we have information on 6 objects
for each country i:
1. y i is a 57 × 1 vector of the total gross production.
2. d Di is a 57 × 1 vector of the domestic final demand.
3. d Ii is a 57 × 1 vector of final import demand.
4. M ii is a 57×57 domestic input-output matrix with elements M ii (s, t) indicating total purchases by sector t of domestic intermediates from sector s.
5. M Ii is a 57 × 57 aggregate import input-output matrix M Ii (s, t) indicating total purchases by sector t of foreign intermediates from sector s.
6. {ex ij } is a collection of 57 × 1 vectors of exports from i to j.
The definition of final demand here follows the national accounts definition of "final goods," including private consumption, government purchases, and investment.
We value each country's output at a single set of prices, independent of where that output is shipped or how it is used. This ensures that the value of production revenue equals expenditure. Put differently, while quantity choices may reflect price differences across destinations or uses that arise due to transport costs, tariffs, and markups, we value the resulting quantity flows at a single set of prices. Following input-output conventions, we use "basic prices" in our empirical work, defined as price received by a producer (minus tax payable or plus subsidy receivable by the producer 
This assumption implies that variation in aggregate bilateral intermediate and final goods flows arises due to variation in the composition of imports across partners.
For example, we would find that U.S. imports from Canada are intermediate goods intensive because most imports from Canada are goods that are on average used as intermediates (e.g., auto parts).
After splitting the data at the disaggregate level, we aggregate the data to form three composite sectors -durable industrial production, nondurable industrial production, and other "services" production. 19 In addition to this input-output data, we use national accounts data from the IMF's Global Data Source, the OECD, and national sources. We highlight specific data below where appropriate. We have real output and demand data for 55 countries. We aggregate the 15 pre-accession EU members to form a single EU15 composite and form a composite rest-of-the-world region out of countries for which output and demand data is not available. reported elasticities, where aggregation weights would be based on the size of the shock hitting each sector. Table 2 presents results for demand changes originating in the U.S. 21 We report responses for the four largest economies (U.S., EU15, Japan and China) separately and collect responses for other countries into five regions to streamline the presentation. Column 1 summarizes the setup of the exercise, recording the response of total final demand to the demand change in each panel. When demand in each sector falls by 1%, total demand falls by that sector's share in total final demand (0.10% for durables, 0.11% for non-durables, and 0.79% for services).
22
We then report elasticities for gross output, GDP, exports and imports in Columns 2-9, decomposing the overall trade elasticities into separate elasticities for final and intermediate goods trade.
[Insert Table 2 here]
To interpret the response of output to demand changes in a particular sector, we recall that c
, where the S ij (s, t) are share weights indicating the share of output produced by sector s in source i used (directly or indirectly) to produce final goods of sector t absorbed in country j. Then if all demand changes other than those in sector r in the US are zero, then c
. This says that the decline in aggregate output in country i equals the total share of output from i that is used to produce final goods in sector r absorbed in the U.S. Changes in aggregate GDP are close 21 Comparable results for the EU15, Japan, and China are reported in Appendix B of the companion working paper (Bems, Johnson and Yi, 2010) . Results for the EU15 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to results for the U.S., with Emerging Europe replacing NAFTA as the trading partner with the largest exposure.
22 To re-normalize shocks so as to generate equal changes in total demand, one can divide the shock by the share of the sector in total demand. Dashes in the table indicate entries that are zero by construction of the exercise.
to, but not equal to, changes in aggregate output. Because value-added to output ratios vary across sectors, the composition of output changes can drive a wedge between aggregate GDP and aggregate output, even though output is proportional to value-added within each sector. For example, looking at Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A of Table 2 , we see that the demand change in services increases gross output by 0.72%, while the increase in GDP is equal to 0.78%.
To summarize the strength of demand spillovers, we compute a metric of the "total demand spillover" associated with each change: response to a shock. To interpret the response of imports, we find it helpful to re-write equation 6 describing the change in imports as: Table 2 is a weighted average of columns 8 and 9 of the table.
U.S. imports rise by 0.35% following a 1% rise in services sector demand, and they rise by 0.25% and 0.33% in response to a 1% rise in nondurables demand and durables demand, respectively. The similarity of these numbers masks large differences in the mechanics of the adjustment, however. First, note that the magnitude of the change in total final demand is very different for a given demand change in each sector. Imports rise by 0.44 times the change in total demand following the 1% change in services demand, and by 2.23 and 3.27 times the change in total demand following the 1% change in nondurables demand and durables demand, respectively. Second, note that the distribution of the import adjustment between final and intermediate goods is quite different across different sectors. The elasticity of intermediate goods trade is higher than that for final goods for demand changes hitting services, but the opposite is true for both nondurables and durables. This requires further explanation.
For final goods, the intuition is simple. The elasticity of final goods imports to a sector-specific change in demand depends on the share of that sector in total imports:
. For example, for the durables and nondurables sectors, the change in final goods imports is large because each sector has a large weight in total final goods imports. Total final goods imports decline by 5.4 times the change in total demand following a 1% change in durables demand, and only by 0.1 times the change in total demand following a 1% change in services demand.
The elasticity of intermediate goods imports to a sector-specific change in demand depends on two forces, the distribution of intermediate import shares across sectors and the response of sectoral output to sector-specific demand changes. To develop intuition, note that the percentage change in U.S. output in sector t for a change in demand in sector r is:
( 1 6 
where ex This response is strongest for durable goods, consistent with integrated production chains in this sector. Second, the breakdown of changes in exports for other 24 Because U.S. services output is very sensitive to domestic demand changes in the service sector (S US,US (services, services)≈ 1), and the service sector has a larger weight in intermediate imports (
, the elasticity of intermediate imports is higher than the elasticity of final imports in response to services demand changes. In contrast, output for durables is less sensitive to changes in domestic demand and intermediate imports by the durables sector constitute a smaller share of total intermediate imports, so the ranking is reversed for durables. This second exercise yields an estimate of the "global elasticity of trade to output" that we then compare to the observed elasticity from this recession.
To estimate changes in demand separately for durables, nondurables and services, we follow a three-step procedure. First, we take realized changes in aggregate demand from national accounts data. Second, we decompose the changes in aggregate demand into changes in goods (durables plus nondurables) demand and changes in services demand. We do this by combining data on GDP and on industrial production with production shares in our input-output framework, making the assumption that changes in domestic demand for services equal changes in domestic supply of services. Third, we decompose changes in goods demand into changes in durables demand and changes in non-durables demand using estimates of durable goods demand changes taken primarily from expenditure data on machinery and equipment.
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All calculations are based on real domestic currency denominated quarterly data, and we define the crisis as taking pace between 2008Q1 and 2009Q1. 26 Details regarding both data and the procedure are included in Appendix B.
25 We obtain durables demand data from a mix of OECD and national sources. For the U.S. and EU15 we use data from the BEA and Eurostat. Because this durables expenditure data is missing for many emerging markets and smaller OECD countries, we make additional assumptions where necessary. If durables production data is available, we use this data for guidance. Alternatively, where no data is available (e.g., for China) we assume that demand declines symmetrically across durables and non-durables. See Appendix B for details.
26 This is the period with the largest decrease in global demand. Further, in looking at Q1 to Q1 changes, we can ignore seasonal adjustments. Figure 1 reports the estimates of sector-specific demand changes for the US and EU15. The total declines in final demand for the U.S. and EU15 were 4.4% and 4.9%, respectively, between 2008 and 2009. Importantly, the decline in demand was distributed very unevenly across sectors. Demand for durables fell by 32% in the U.S. and 23% in EU15, while demand for nondurables and services fell by less than 4%.
Transmission of U.S. and EU15 Demand Changes
[ Figure 1 here] Table 3 reports the changes in production and trade that result from changes in demand in the United States, feeding estimated changes in demand for services, nondurable, and durables through the framework simultaneously. The overall changes should be thought of as a weighted aggregation of the three panels in Table 2 , with the realized sectoral demand changes in Figure 1 used as weights for each panel.
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Given the dominance of demand changes for durables in aggregate data, it is not surprising that results in Table 3 resemble most closely Panel C in Table 2. [ Table 3 here] Though the overall decline in U.S. demand is only 4.4%, the sectoral asymmetry of the decline implies that the changes are transmitted strongly abroad. In columns 4-9, we see that U.S. exports and imports fall by 1.7% and 11.4%, respectively. Note here that exports fall, even though final demand in all other countries/regions is kept constant, entirely due to the U.S. involvement in cross-border production networks.
The demand elasticity of exports in the U.S. is measured to be 0.4, a sizable figure.
The large decline in durables demand, combined with integrated cross-border production networks for durable goods, causes exports to fall significantly, while total demand falls only modestly because durables make up only a small share of total demand.
Turning to imports, the fall in US imports is several times larger than the fall in demand. This is another implication of the asymmetric change in demand across sectors, with demand falling most for durables. Breaking down this import decline, both final and intermediate goods imports exhibit elasticities to total demand that exceed 1. However, the effect on imports of intermediates is much less pronounced. Asia is a product of the fact that they produce durables.
One further point to note about cross-border transmission patterns is that they cannot be explained with the standard openness measures, such as trade/GDP. Consider China and Japan, for example. Both intermediate and final exports from Japan fall by more than exports from China. This is the case despite the fact that the U.S. is a bigger direct export market for China than it is for Japan.
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The export response for Japan is larger because a good deal of Japanese value-added is exported to the United States through China and other countries. This can be seen via the result that the percentage drop in China's (and Emerging Asia's) imports of intermediates is 60-80% larger than Japan's. Our input-output framework takes this indirect transmission channel into account.
Looking directly at output and GDP, U.S. gross output and GDP fall by 3.9% and 3.2%, respectively, which is less than the fall in U.S. final demand. The total demand spillover (defined above) is 0.37, which implies large total cross-border spillovers.
For example, GDP in NAFTA falls by 2.3%, which is nearly 3/4 of the size of the fall in U.S. GDP. In Emerging Asia and China, GDP contracts by 1.1% and in Japan by 0.9%; all of these are sizable contractions in absolute terms.
Results for estimated demand changes in EU15 are presented in Table 4 . Because the EU is of similar size to the U.S., it has comparable demand elasticities for trade and output at sectoral level (see the Appendix B in Bems, Johnson and Yi, 2010) , and has a similar pattern of demand changes, results for trade and output following the EU-only demand change are comparable to the U.S. Notably, Emerging Europe takes the place of NAFTA as the region with the most intensive trade linkages and is hence hit hardest by the fall in EU demand. Overall, the global impact of demand changes in the two regions is quite similar, owing to the fact that the two economies represent comparable shares of the world demand, output and trade.
[ Table 4 here]
Response of World Trade to Demand Changes in All Countries
We now assess whether our framework delivers a quantitatively realistic decline in world trade. We generate a model-based elasticity of trade to output (GDP or production) during the crisis by feeding the actual changes in final demand for all countries through the framework simultaneously. To generate results that are comparable to standard approaches to calculating this elasticity in data, we now disaggregate EU15 into 15 separate countries, each with its own vector of demand changes.
29 Figure 2 illustrates estimated demand changes for the largest 10 countries.
30
As noted previously for the U.S. and EU15, demand changes are highly asymmetric across sectors, with durables demand falling substantially more than demand for either nondurables or services.
[ Figure 2 here] Table 5 , Panel A reports the changes in trade and production by country/region when demand changes simultaneously in all countries and sectors. 31 We generate a synchronized global recession, which is unsurprising since observed demand changes 29 With the disaggregation of the EU15 composite, we now count intra-EU trade in our world trade aggregates and in the table report changes in trade for the EU including both extra-EU and intra-EU trade.
30 Note that we do not disaggregate durables and nondurables demand for China due to lack of data. This assumption almost surely biases our global elasticity estimates downward.
31 Further details about the fit of the I-O model results with data at the level of 55 countries are provided in Appendix D of the working paper version of this paper (Bems, Johnson and Yi, 2010). are synchronized across countries in the data. Global GDP falls by 3.7 percent.
Panel A also shows that global trade declines by 10.5 percent; hence, our framework delivers an elasticity of world trade to world GDP of 2.8. This elasticity lies between two polar benchmarks. One benchmark arises from a world in which all changes in demand across sectors and countries are identical in magnitude; in this case, owing to the linearity of our framework the elasticity of world trade to world GDP would be one. Another benchmark is the actual elasticity observed in the data, which was about 4. While we are unable to "account" for the full collapse of world trade, our framework delivers approximately 70% of the decline relying solely on changes in final demand.
[ Table 5 here]
To unpack our elasticity, we focus attention on three points. First, the elasticity in our framework is high because we (realistically) allow asymmetries in the collapse of demand across sectors. To illustrate this, we compute the response of output and trade within our framework under alternative, counter-factual, more symmetric changes in demand.
32 Panel B of Table 5 reports results where we assume demand changes are identical in durable and nondurable sectors (a two-sector economy).
Panel C of Table 5 reports results where we assume demand changes are identical in all three sectors (a one-sector economy). Note that the elasticity of world trade to production falls as we move from asymmetric to symmetric demand changes, Panels A to C. In the extreme case of a one-sector economy, trade and output are both approximately proportional to the change in world demand. Moving to a twosector framework, the elasticity rises to 2.3, which is substantially higher and more realistic based on historical data. There is substantial additional gain from moving to the three-sector framework in terms of matching data relative to the two-sector framework.
Second, this aggregate elasticity is a composite of underlying heterogeneous subelasticities -for intermediate versus final goods, for particular countries. For example, the headline elasticity is higher than the elasticity of world trade in response to demand changes in just the United States, which was 2.2 in Table 2 . 33 The elasticity for simultaneous demand changes in all countries is higher partly because most other countries are more open than the U.S.
Third, we find a quantitatively large difference in trade elasticities for final and intermediate goods -4.3 for final goods and 2.0 for intermediates. This finding is interesting when set against the common perception that intermediates in aggregate trade flows should increase the income elasticity of trade, not decrease it.
Our results do not necessarily rule out a role for intermediates, specifically, vertical linkages, in making world trade sensitive to income changes, but we point out that the opposite holds in our input-output framework.
Concluding Remarks
Using a global input-output framework, we have argued that demand spillovers played an important role in explaining both the collapse of trade and transmission of the global recession. Demand changes in the U.S. and EU15, the epicenter of the crisis, appear to have been strongly transmitted to foreign countries via trade channels. The large magnitude of these spillovers hinges on the fact that demand changes were concentrated on the durables sector, which is both highly traded as a final good and tightly integrated into global supply chains. Feeding demand changes in all countries through our framework simultaneously, we find that demand changes alone can account for a large portion of the fall in the ratio of world trade to GDP. In particular, our framework generates an elasticity of 2.8, about 70% of that observed during the recession. Based on the fact that the elasticity rises as we disaggregate our model, we believe the trade to GDP elasticity would be higher if we had the data to disaggregate the model even further. In sum, this evidence suggests that the durables-biased collapse in aggregate demand during the global crisis is a key piece of the explanation of both the strength of transmission of the crisis via trade and the collapse of world trade.
In developing these results, we have dedicated attention to specifying a rich set of cross-country intermediate and final goods linkages. We do not explicitly model the "standard" trade transmission channel in which home income declines, leading to decreased import demand, and thereby causing a decline in foreign exports and income, and so on. As a result, we cannot use our framework to recover fundamental structural shocks or study how those shocks are transmitted across countries. In future work, we plan to articulate both the supply and demand side of the model more fully so as to recover genuine shocks. This structural approach will open the door to a more precise quantification of the role of trade as a transmission channel, as well as allow us to quantify how much different countries/regions have contributed the fall in global trade and output. 
A Interpreting the Share Weighting Matrix
This appendix discusses the derivation and interpretation of the equation linking output to demand changes: equation 4 in the text. Stacking and manipulating equation 3, we can write:
. . . 
To interpret this matrix, we define: This defines a decomposition of output decomposition according to where that output is embedded in final demand. The share matrix defined in equation 4 then computes the shares associated with this output decomposition and arranges them appropriately to premultiply the vector of demand changes.
assumes that in the service sector trade balance did not change during the crisis (∆NX s = 0), nor did the stock of services (∆V s = 0). Finally, the estimated post-crisis level of domestic demand for goods, A . To do this, we turn to data on durables demand changes to back out the demand for non-durables that is consistent with changes in aggregate demand. Formally: 
Since detailed expenditure data separating durables and nondurables is not available for all across countries, we combine several types of data to perform this calculation (i.e., estimate ∆ e A d ). For the U.S. and EU15, we use data from the BEA and Eurostat on machinery and equipment investment. For other countries, our preferred series is investment expenditures on machinery and equipment from OECD quarterly national accounts. 34 For select countries (e.g., Chile, U.K.) we prioritize national data sources. Finally, for a few countries (e.g., Brazil), we use industrial production data for capital goods and consumer durables to proxy for demand changes. This supply-side data will yield a good estimate of demand changes if we assume that ∆V d = 0 and ∆NX d = 0. For one major country, China, we were unable to locate any usable data to perform this durables/nondurables split. We therefore assume that demand changes are symmetric across durables and nondurables sectors in China.
